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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Southern District of California has experienced the same
proliferation of local rules that has afflicted many federal district courts
throughout the nation. 1 Typical of other district courts, the Southern
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1. The 1989 report of the Local Rules Project documented the tremendous
increase in promulgation of local rules by federal district courts nationwide. See
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT: LOCAL RULES ON CIVIL
PRACTICE ( I 989) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT]. See also Daniel
R. Coquillette et al., The Role of Local Rules, A.B.A. J., Jan. I 989, at 62 (summarizing
Local Rules Project report); infra notes I 6-2 I and accompanying text. Several scholars
have analyzed the reasons for, as well as the consequences of, this proliferation of local
procedures. See, e.g., Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447 (1994); Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation
in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375 (I 992); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform
and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393 (1992)
[hereinafter Tobias, Balkanization]; Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules. Local Rules, and
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District has promulgated local rules after some opportunity for comment
from the local federal bar,2 but has imposed the rules without external
scrutiny or other meaningful review. The Southern District has approximately eighty separate local rules, many with multiple subparts, which
fill fifty pages of double-column fine print. 3 In addition, 435 or so
"General Orders"-many the functional equivalent of local
rules--announce policies and procedures for the district court. This
proliferation of procedural rules means that a Southern District
practitioner seeking an answer to a procedural question faces a more
complicated task than merely consulting the relevant federal rules and
federal statutes; counsel must also determine whether any local rules and
general orders control.
The task becomes even more challenging when the local and federal
rules are inconsistent. Despite the directive of 28 U.S.C. § 2071 and
Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that local rules be
consistent with the federal rules and federal statutes, many of the
Southern District's local rules conflict with federal law. 4 Other local
rules may not conflict, but duplicate the analogous federal rule by
repeating it with slightly different language.
The Committee to Review Local District Rules, a newly constituted
task force under the auspices of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council, is
currently undertaking a comprehensive review of all local rules of the
district courts within the Ninth Circuit. The charge of this ad hoc
committee is to identify local rules in each district that are inconsistent
with, or duplicative of, the federal rules or the United States Code.
Through this task force review process, the Ninth Circuit Judicial

State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 1999 ( 1989).
Professor Carl Tobias attributes the recent proliferation of local district court
rules--which he decries as the "balkanization" of a once uniform and simple national
rule system----to a variety offactors, the most significant of which has been the perceived
explosion of litigation and litigation abuses since the mid-1970s. See Tobias,
Balkanization, supra, at 1396. The federal trial courts responded to this perceived
explosion by actively employing numerous local practices (for example, discovery
limitations, pretrial conferences, alternative dispute resolution, and sanctions) designed
to expedite dispute resolution and to prevent or remedy abuses. Id. at 1396-1406. The
primary means by which the district courts sought to achieve this goal of managerial
judging was through promulgation of local rules. Id. at 1397-99. See generally infra
notes 14-16, 29-34 and accompanying text.
2. A 1988 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 207l(b)(l994) requires the district court to
give public notice of proposed local rules and an opportunity for comment on them prior
to adoption. FED. R. CIV. P. 83, as amended in 1985, contains similar requirements.
3. By comparison, publication of all 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in the same format would require approximately 45 pages.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994); FED. R. CIV. P. 83.
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Council hopes to implement the oversight responsibilities imposed on it
by the Judicial Improvements Acts and by Federal Rule 83. 5 The
Committee anticipates submission of a final report in Spring 1997.
This Article contains an overview of some conflicts with and
duplication of federal laws apparent in the current local rules of the
Southern District and concludes with some curative suggestions for the
district court and for the Ninth Circuit. The forthcoming report of the
Ninth Circuit Judicial Council's Committee to Review Local District
Rules will contain more detailed analyses and recommendations with
respect to these and other local rules.
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LOCAL RULES REVIEW PROCESS

A.

The Phenomenon of Local Rules Proliferation

Local federal rules have existed in one form or another since the
creation of federal trial courts in 1789. 6 Prior to the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules), federal statutes already
authorized the district courts to make local rules not inconsistent with
federal law. 7 The Rules Enabling Act of 19348 carried forward this authority to make local rules not inconsistent with the Federal Rules, as did
the original version of Federal Rule 83. The new scheme of national
uniform rules embodied in the 1938 Federal Rules, therefore, appreciated
the practical need for local rules to fill in gaps in the Federal Rules and
to respond to local conditions. 9 Soon after the Federal Rules became

5. See Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Circuit Court Review of Local Procedures,
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359, 364-365 (1995) (swnmarizing the Ninth Circuit's efforts
at local rules review) [hereinafter Tobias, Suggestions].
6. See Jack B. Weinstein, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 117
(1977); Note, Rule 83 and the Local Federal Rules, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1251, 12531254 (1967) [hereinafter Local Federal Rules]; Subrin, supra note I, at 2012.
7. E.g., Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 7, I Stat. 335; 28 U.S.C. § 731 (1873)
(originally enacted as Act of Aug. 23, 1842, ch. 188, § 6); Equity Rule 79,226 U.S. 673
(1912). See Local Federal Rules, supra note 6, at 1253-1254 (summarizing statutory
authority for local rules before 1938); Subrin, supra note I, at 2012 (summarizing
district court local rulemaking power from 1789 until the Conformity Act of I 872, and
from I 872 until the Rules Enabling Act of 1934).
8. Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934)(current version codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2071-2077 (1994)).
9. See Subrin, supra note I, at 2013.
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effective, the Judicial Conference of the United States, 10 the policymaking arm of the federal courts, recognized the need to review thenexisting local rules for compliance with the new national rules. The
Judicial Conference appointed a committee, which became known as the
Knox committee, to review local rules for the purpose of developing
recommendations to achieve a greater degree of simplicity and uniformity.11 After a comprehensive survey, the 1940 Knox committee report
found that several district courts had local rules that repeated or conflicted with the Federal Rules and made appropriate recommendations. 12
For the next several decades, the federal trial courts seemed satisfied
with the procedural scheme of uniform national rules and limited local
variations. 13
Beginning in the mid- l 970s, however, federal judges became
increasingly dissatisfied with the Federal Rules, which they perceived as
fostering an explosion of litigation and litigation abuses in the federal
courts. 14 This dissatisfaction gave rise to new efforts by federal judges
to more actively manage the conduct of civil litigation, which, in tum,
led to their increasing reliance on local rules and procedures. 15 The

I 0. The Judicial Conference of the United States consists of the Chief Justice of
the U.S. Supreme Court, the chief judge of each judicial circuit and of the Court of
International Trade, and a district judge from each judicial circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 331
( 1988). The Conference possesses a variety of responsibilities with respect to
improvement of the administration of justice in the federal courts including the duty to
make comprehensive surveys of the condition of business in the federal courts, to submit
recommendations to the various courts to promote uniformity of management procedures
and the expeditious conduct of court business, and to study and make recommendations
to the Supreme Court with respect to the Federal Rules. Id. The Judicial Conference
also has the power to review local rules of the courts of appeals for consistency with
federal law, and to modify or abrogate any such circuit rule found inconsistent. Id. The
Judicial Conference does not have any similar direct authority to review local rules of
the district courts. Id.
11. See Subrin, supra note I, at 20 I 6.
12. See REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON LOCAL
DISTRICT COURT RULES (1940). See generally Subrin, supra note I, at 2016-19
(discussing the Knox committee report).
13. See Subrin, supra note I, at 2017-18. This historical overview of local rules
review draws substantially from the various works of several scholars, but particularly
those of Professor Carl Tobias whose extensive writings on the proliferation of local
rules and on the Judicial Improvements Acts illuminate the problems associated with the
attempts at local rules oversight. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, More Modern Civil Process, 56
U. PITT. L. REV. 801, 814-831 (1995); Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990
Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1589, 1592-93 (1994) [hereinafter Tobias,
Improving the Acts]; Tobias, Balkanization, supra note I, at 1393-1413; Tobias,
Suggestions, supra note 5, at 359-367.
14. See Tobias, Improving the Acts, supra note 13, at 1593-99; Tobias,
Balkanization, supra note I, at 1395-99; Tobias, More Modern Civil Process, supra note
13, at 810-12.
15. See sources cited supra note 14.
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growth in district court local rules continued during the 198Os and 199Os
with a resultant decline in the uniformity, simplicity, and transsubstantivity of federal procedure envisioned by the Federal Rules. 16
During the 198Os, the Judicial Conference became increasingly
concerned with the proliferation of local rules by the various district
courts. 17 The Conference was particularly troubled by those local
procedural requirements that appeared to conflict with the Federal Rules
or with sections of the United States Code. In 1986, the Conference
commissioned the Local Rules Project to systematically review all local
rules and procedures, to identify problems associated with local rules
proliferation, and to make recommendations to resolve these problems.18 The Local Rules Project published its findings and recommendations in a 1989 report entitled Report of the Local Rules Project:
Local Rules on Civil Practice. 19 This report not only verified the
suspected proliferation of local rules, 20 but also identified widespread
instances of their possible inconsistencies with, and repetition of, federal
rules or statutes. 21 Based on this report, the Judicial Conference requested all district courts to conform their local procedures to the
Federal Rules. 22 For a variety of reasons, few courts have complied. 23

16. See Tobias, Improving the Acts, supra note 13, at 1598-1622; Tobias,
Balkanization, supra note I, at 1397-1403.
17. See Coquillette et. al., supra note I, at 65; Tobias, Improving the Acts, supra
note 13, at 1596-97; Tobias, Balkanization, supra note I, at 1398-99.
18. See Subrin, supra note 1, at 2019-20.
19. REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 1.
20. The Report of the Local Rules Project observed:
The ninety-four district courts currently have an aggregate of approximately
5,000 local rules, not including many "sub-rules," standing orders and standard
operating procedures. These rules are extraordinarily diverse and their
numbers continue to grow rapidly. To give one stark example, the Central
District of California, based in Los Angeles, has about thirty-one local rules
with 434 "sub-rules," supplemented by approximately 275 standing orders. At
the other extreme, the Middle District of Georgia has only one local rule and
just one standing order. These local rules literally cover the entire spectrum
of federal practice, from attorney admission and attorney discipline, through
the various stages of trial, including pleading and filing requirements, pre-trial
discovery procedures, and taxation of costs.
REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 1, at 1.
21. See Subrin, supra note I, at 2021-26.
22. See Tobias, Improving the Acts, supra note 13, at 1597.
23. Id. Some of the reasons for the district courts' failure to comply are discussed
infra note 99.
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Congress also focused its attention on the problems associated with
local rules proliferation specifically, and with civil litigation generally,
and passed two pieces of remedial legislation at the end of the 1980s:
The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988 (Judicial
Improvements Act)24 and the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
(CJRA). 25 Unfortunately, these two Acts represent largely incompatible
views with respect to local rules and have greatly complicated current
efforts toward local rules review.
By enacting the 1988 Judicial Improvements Act, Congress sought to
reverse the proliferation of local rules and restore the primacy of the
uniform Federal Rules. 26 The 1988 Act requires each district court to
appoint a local rules committee to advise the court with respect to
formulation of local rules, and to provide public notice and opportunity
for comment prior to adoption of local rules. 27 More significantly, the
Act requires each circuit judicial council to periodically review all local
rules for consistency with the Federal Rules and empowers each council
to "modify or abrogate any such [local] rule found inconsistent in the
course of such a review. " 28
Two years later, Congress turned its attention to very different
concerns with the civil justice system: the perceived problems of
litigation abuses, increased costs, and lengthening delays in federal civil
litigation. After considering recommendations for improvement-mostly
reforms relating to litigation management, judicial monitoring of
discovery, and alternative dispute resolution-----Congress passed the CJRA
in 1990. 29 The CJRA required each of the ninety-four federal district
courts to adopt an individualized civil justice and delay reduction plan
by December 1993. 30 The CJRA directed each district to appoint an
advisory group consisting of local attorneys, client representatives, and
the U.S Attorney to help formulate a plan based on the particular needs
and circumstances of the district. 31 The advisory group was instructed
to review the court's docket, evaluate the reasons for the district's civil

24.

Title IV of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub.

L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4648 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d)(4),

2071-2074 (1994)).
25. Title I of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5090 (1990) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994)).
26. See Tobias, Improving the Acts, supra note I 3, at I 623-27.
27. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2077(b)(I994).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(4)(1988).
29. The legislative background of the CJRA is discussed in detail in Mullenix,
supra note I, and in Tobias, Improving the Acts, supra note 13, at 1601-04.
30. 28 u.s.c. § 471 (1994).
31. 28 u.s.c. §§ 472,478 (1994).
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litigation delays, and recommend cost and delay reduction measures. 32
The district court must develop an expense and delay reduction plan
after considering the advisory group's recommendations, litigation
management principles, and the cost and delay reduction techniques set
forth in the CJRA. 33 The CJRA also created committees to monitor
and assess the plans. 34
These two Acts are at cross-purposes. The Judicial Improvements
Act's purpose is to rein in local rules, remove conflicts, and restore
uniformity; the CJRA's goal is to reduce costs and delays by improved
judicial case management. 35 To accomplish the latter goal, the CJRA
encouraged federal district courts to experiment with local procedures
and rules. 36 Not only did the CJRA invite each district to expand its
local rules, but, by implication, authorized each district to promulgate
local rules that may conflict with the Federal Rules. 37 The CJRA of
1990 altered the 1988 Judicial Improvements Act's directive to each
circuit judicial council as to local rule oversight and, more significantly,
effectively suspended efforts to implement the earlier Act's mandate to
limit local rules. 38
More recently, an unexpected source has further complicated the local
rules review process. The 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure sanction local variations from the Federal Rules
themselves, although on a more limited basis than the CJRA. Most
notably, new Federal Rule 26 permits each district court to opt out of the
automatic disclosures, quantity limitations, and certain other discovery
requirements imposed by the 1993 amendments. 39

32. 28 u.s.c. §§ 472-473, 478 (1994).
33. 28 U.S.C. §§ 472(a), 473(a),(b)(1994).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 474(a),(b)(I994).
35. See Tobias, Improving the Acts, supra note 13, at 1623-27.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(6)(1994)(authorizing the district court to include various
specified litigation management and delay reduction techniques, including "such other
features as the district court considers appropriate after considering the recommendations
of the advisory group").
37. See Tobias, Improving the Acts, supra note 13, at 1620; Robel, supra note I,
at 1467-70.
38. See Tobias, Improving the Acts, supra note 13, at 1623-27; Tobias, More
Modern Civil Process, supra note 13, at 819, 824-26.
39. See FED. R. C1v. P. 26(a)(I) (authorizing local rules that exempt litigants from
compliance with various automatic initial disclosures); id. 26(b)(2) (authorizing district
courts to alter the numerical limits imposed on depositions and interrogatories, and the
length limits imposed on depositions and requests for admission); id. 26(d) (authorizing
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The Ninth Circuit Judicial Council directed its Local Rules Review
Committee to exclude from review those local rules adopted by the district courts under the authority of the CJRA or the 1993 Federal Rule
amendments. 40 Likewise, this Article does not discuss several local
rules adopted pursuant to the Southern District's Delay and Cost
Reduction Plan under the CJRA, 41 nor those local discovery rules
adopted pursuant to the Southern District's standing order opting out of
some of the 1993 amendments to Federal Rules on discovery. 42 The
CJRA is scheduled to sunset in December 1997.43 If Congress does
permit the CJRA to expire at that time, the Southern District may then
need to modify the local rules implementing its CJRA plan to conform
once again to the Federal Rules. 44

local rules that except parties from certain limitations on the timing and sequence of
discovery); id. 26(f) (authorizing local rules that exempt parties from a required meeting
to discuss case and develop proposed discovery plan).
40. See Memorandum from Margaret Z. Johns, Chair, Local Rules Review
Committee, to Local Rules Reviewers, at 2 (Apr. 17, 1995) (on file with author).
41. The Southern District's Delay and Cost Reduction Plan was adopted by
General Order No. 394 on June 3, I 992, with occasional amendments thereafter. E.g.,
General Order No. 394, In the Matter of the Delay and Cost Reduction Plan Under the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (S.D. Cal. June 3, 1992); General Order No. 394-E,
General Order Regarding Proposed Modification to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, I 993); General Order No. 394-1, General Order Regarding Proposed
Modification to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (S.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1995). The
Plan authorizes an Early Neutral Evaluation Conference and a Case Management
Conference to supervise discovery, encourage settlement, explore arbitration and other
alternative dispute resolutions, and otherwise manage pretrial proceedings. See S.D.
CAL. R. 16.l(c)-(e), 16.2, 16.3, 37.1. The Plan also contains specific time restrictions---which often conflict with the Federal Rules---for service of process, extensions,
default judgments, and summary judgment motions. See S.D. CAL. R. 4.l(a),(b), 12.1,
16.3(n)(l)-(6), 55.1.
42. Pursuant to General Order No. 394-1, the Southern District has ordered that
compliance with the following 1993 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not required:
Federal Rules 26(a)(l)-(4) (pretrial disclosures), 26(f) (meeting of parties regarding
discovery), 30(a)(2)(A)&(C)(limits on oral depositions), and 33(a), 34(b), and 46(a)(insofar as these rules require leave of court or stipulation for serving interrogatories,
document production requests, and requests for admissions). General Order No. 394-1,
supra note 41. This General Order is codified in several local rules. See S.D. CAL. R.
26.I(f), 30.I(d), 33.I(d), 36.I(d), 34.l(a).
43. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § I03(b)(2), 104
Stat. 5089 (1990).
44. See Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 5, at 368 ("Should Congress permit the
CJRA to sunset as scheduled in I 997, the conflicting [local] procedures adopted under
the CJRA ought to sunset as well.") (footnote omitted).

562

[VOL. 33: 555, 1996]

Review of Local Rules
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

B.

Statutory Prescriptions Regarding Local Rules and Local Rules
Review

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2071 authorizes individual federal district courts to
adopt local rules, but mandates that such rules "be consistent with" the
Federal Rules and federal statutes and be "prescribed only after giving
appropriate public notice and an opportunity for comment."45 Likewise, Federal Rule 83 authorizes each district court to make and amend
rules "not inconsistent with these [Federal Rules]." In addition, Federal
Rule 83 provides: "A local rule must be consistent with---but not
duplicative of-Acts of Congress and [the Federal Rules]."46
The Judicial Improvements Act of 1988 requires each circuit judicial
council to periodically review local rules adopted by district courts for
consistency with national rules. 47 In the Ninth Circuit, the Judicial
Council delegated this responsibility to the Conference of Chief District
Judges, a creation of the Judicial Council. 48 The Chair of this Conference, Chief Judge Robert Coyle of the Eastern District of California,
appointed a Committee to Review Local District Rules to carry out this
charge. 49 The membership of this Committee includes three district
court chief judges, a clerk of the court, two law professors, and
representatives of the federal bar. In addition, several law professors
serve as volunteer local reviewers. In anticipation of the amendment to
Federal Rule 83, the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council expanded the scope
of the Committee to include review of local rules that are duplicative of
national rules. 50 However, as discussed above, the Judicial Council
excluded as outside the scope of the Committee's review (1) local rules
promulgated by a district court pursuant to the Civil Justice Reform Act

45. 28 U.S.C. § 207l(a),(b) (1994).
46. FED. R. C1v. P. 83 (emphasis added). Unfortunately, the 1995 amendment to
Federal Rule 83 does not define what it means by "duplicative" or "consistent" rule,
leaving considerable room for legitimate debate.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(4)(1994).
48. See Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 5, at 365.
49. Id.
50. See Memorandum from Margaret Z. Johns, Chair, Local Rules Review
Committee, to Local Rules Reviewers, at 2 (May 26, 1995) (on file with author).
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of 1990 (CJRA) and (2) local rules promulgated to implement, suspend,
or modify the 1993 amendments of the Federal Rules. 51
The Committee to Review Local District Rules anticipates submission
of a final report to the Conference of Chief District Judges in Spring
1997. The Judical Improvements Act of 1988 empowers each circuit
judicial council, in the course of its review process, to modify or
abrogate any district court local rules within the circuit found to be
inconsistent with federal rules or statutes. 52 Whether and to what
extent the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council will exercise this power with
respect to inconsistent local rules, including those of the Southern
District, remain to be seen.
The remainder of this Article discusses some preliminary findings with
respect to the local rules of the Southern District of California as well
as some suggestions for the district court and the Ninth Circuit Judicial
Council with respect to local rules review.
III.

LOCAL RULES THAT CONFLICT WITH FEDERAL LAW

A.

"Unintentional" Conflicts

Many of the Southern District of California Rules (Local Rules)
conflict with provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal
Rules). 53 Some of these conflicts may simply reflect an inadvertent
failure to conform the local rule to an amendment to the Federal Rules.
In these cases, the conflict may be unintentional. Local Rule 48.1, for
example, provides: "In all civil actions in which a party is entitled to a
jury trial, the jury shall consist of six members and such alternates as the
judge may determine." 54 The 1991 amendments to Federal Rules 47
and 48, however, abolished the institution of the alternate juror.55

51. See Memorandum from Margaret Z. Johns, Chair, Local Rules Review
Committee, to Local Rules Reviewers, at 2 (Apr. 17, 1995) (on file with author).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(4)(1994).
53. The Committee's review of local rules is not limited to conflicts with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but also includes inconsistencies with federal statutes
and with other federal rules such as the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, the Rules Governing
Section 2254 Proceedings in the United States
District Courts, and the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases in the United States
District Courts. This part of the Article surveys conflicts between the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Southern District's civil rules because these conflicts are the
most significant and numerous.
54. S.D. CAL. R. 48.1 (effective Dec. 2, 1991).
55. The provision for alternate jurors in former Federal Rule 47 was stricken, and
the institution of the alternate juror was abolished, by the 1991 amendments. See FED.
R. C1v. P. 47 advisory committee's notes (1991 amendment). The reason for this
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Although the Southern District's actual practice undoubtedly complies
with current Federal Rules 47 and 48, the district court neglected to
revise Local Rule 48.1 to conform to the 1991 amendments.
Likewise, at numerous points the Southern District's local rules
instruct the clerk not to accept for filing any document which does not
comply with the various form requirements imposed by the Local
Rules. 56 Such a delegation of authority may have been appropriate
when these local rule provisions were first adopted, but no longer.
Federal Rule 5(e), as amended in 1991, provides: "The clerk shall not
refuse to accept for filing any paper presented for that purpose solely
because it is not presented in the proper form as required by these rules

abolition, according to the Advisory Committee, was: "The use of alternate jurors has
been a source of dissatisfaction with the jury system because of the burden it places on
alternates who are required to listen to the evidence but denied the satisfaction of
participating in its evaluation." Id. Because the institution of the alternate juror has
been abolished, the Advisory Committee also advised that it will ordinarily be prudent
and necessary in civil actions, in order to provide for sickness or disability among jurors,
to seat more than the constitutionally permissible minimum of six jurors. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 48 advisory committee's notes (1991 amendment). This advice also calls into
question the continued propriety of Local Rule 48.1 's directive that juries in civil actions
consist of only six members. See S.D. CAL. R. 48.1.
56. Local Rule 5. l(t) provides: "Unless a waiver is first obtained from the court,
the clerk shall not file any document which does not comply with the requirements of
these rules. Said document will be endorsed 'lodged' until approved by the court."
S.D. CAL. R. 5. l(t). Several other rules contain similar instructions to the clerk with
respect to specified nonconforming documents. See, e.g., S.D. CAL. R. l.l(d)(l3)
(defining "file" to mean acceptance by the clerk of a document), 5. l(g) (authorizing clerk
to refuse to accept for filing any pleading unless entitled an adversary proceeding
naming the defendant), 9.3(a) (authorizing clerk to return nonconforming habeas corpus
petition), 15.1 (declaring that no pleading shall be deemed amended until amendment
complies with local rules).
The Southern District has recently amended two other rules, Local Rules 4.2 and
9.4(a), that had contained such instructions to the clerk. Effective July 15, 1996, Local
Rule 9.4(a) no longer provides that the clerk "shall" return complaints by prisoners under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) which do not comply with the form requirements specified in
the rule, but now provides that the clerk "may" return such noncomplying complaints
when tendered to the clerk for filing. S.D. CAL. R. 9.4(a). The amendment to Local
Rule 4.2 deleted the instruction to the clerk to return any action, sought to be filed in
forma pauperis, which was not accompanied by a supporting declaration that complied
with the numerous content requirements of that rule. S.D. CAL. R. 4.2. Local Rule 4.2
as amended still requires that the declaration in support of a request to proceed in forma
pauperis shall contain numerous specified statements; and, presumably, the clerk still has
the authority under Local Rule 5.1 (g) to not file any declaration that fails to comply with
the requirements of Local Rule 4.2.
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or any local rules or practices."57 The Advisory Committee's Note to
Federal Rule 5(e) explains that the refusal to accept for filing nonconforming papers is not a suitable role for the office of the clerk, and that
local rules allowing such refusals are proscribed. 58 These various local
provisions instructing the clerk not to accept nonconforming papers
obviously conflict with Federal Rule 5(e) and should be rescinded by the
district court.

B.
1.

"Intentional" Conflicts

Fact Pleading and the RICO Case Statement

Other inconsistencies cannot be characterized as mere inadvertent
failures to keep current with Federal Rule amendments. For example,
three Southern District local rules require "fact pleading" in circumstances where the Federal Rules do not require such a heightened
pleading standard. 59 The most significant is Local Rule 11.1, which
requires any plaintiff bringing a civil action under the federal Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 60 to file, within thirty
days of filing the complaint, a "RICO Case Statement," which the court

57. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(e).
58. The Advisory Committee offered the following additional explanation for this
I 99 I amendment: "The enforcement of these rules and of local rules is a role for a
judicial officer. A clerk may of course advise a party or counsel that a particular instrument is not in proper form, and may be directed to so inform the court." FED. R. CIV.
P. 5(e) advisory committee's note (1991 amendment).
59. Local Rule 3.2(a) requires each complaint to state the "facts supporting ...
jurisdiction." S.D. CAL. R. 3.2(a). Local Rule 23.l(b)(2) requires a pleading alleging
a class action to contain a "statement of facts showing that the party is entitled to
maintain the action under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 23 F. R. Civ. P." S.D. CAL.
R. 23.l(b)(2). Local Rule I I.I requires plaintiffs in civil RICO actions to file a "RICO
Case Statement" which states in detail the specific factual information requested in that
form. S.D. CAL. R. I I.I.
60. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994). The RICO statutes authorize a private cause
of action for treble damages, plus attorneys fees, for any person injured in his business
or property by reason of a "pattern of racketeering activity" or collection of an unlawful
debt. Id.§§ 1962, 1964(c). A "pattern of racketeering activity" requires the commission
of two or more predicate acts of"racketeering activity" within ten years. Id. § 1961(5).
"Racketeering activity," as defined by RICO, includes "any act or threat involving
murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene
matter, or dealing in a controlled substance" chargeable under state law; or any act
indictable under several provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code, including
bribery, counterfeiting, theft from interstate shipping, embezzlement from pension funds,
mail and wire fraud, obstruction of justice, witness tampering, illegal gambling business,
money laundering, interstate transportation of stolen property, obscene matter, and sexual
exploitation of children. Id. § 1961 (I).
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shalt construe as an amendment to the pleadings. 61 This mandatory
case statement contains twenty separate requests, some with numerous
subparts, for detailed information about the factual bases for the civil
RICO claims. 62 These detailed requests must be answered with
specificity; failure to file a detailed case statement which responds to
these requests with the required specificity will subject the RICO claims
to dismissal. 63

61. When the Southern District adopted the RICO Case Statement requirement by
a general order in January, 1992, it explained that civil RICO claims "tend to expand the
scope of a given case, increase discovery, lead to numerous time-consuming and costly
motions to dismiss, and prevent possible settlement of litigation. This order is not
intended to minimize valid claims of to render their prosecution more difficult." General
Order No. 386 Revised, Civil RICO Actions Filed in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of California Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1992).
The RICO Case Statement requirement was not, however, adopted as part of the
Southern District's CJRA Delay and Cost Reduction Plan. See General Order No. 394.
supra note 41.
62. The RICO Case Statement requires the civil RICO claimant to provide detailed
information about such matters as the defendants and their alleged misconduct and the
basis of liability of each defendant, the alleged victims and their injuries, the pattern of
racketeering activities, the enterprise, the relationship between the enterprise and the
volunteering activity, the effect on interstate commerce, the causal relationship between
the alleged injuries and the violation of the RICO statute, and "any additional
information that you feel would be helpful to the court in processing your RICO claims."
General Order No. 394, supra note 41. The detailed factual information requested in
paragraph 5 of the RICO Case Statement, reproduced infra note 67, exemplifies the
kinds of information sought in the remainder of the Case Statement.
63. S.D. CAL. R. 11.l(b). The Southern District is not alone in requiring detailed
fact pleading as a means of judicially managing civil RICO actions. See Richard L.
Marcus, The R~ival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 433, 460-462 (1986). The civil RICO litigation boom that began in the
1980s caused many courts to impose specificity in pleading in order to facilitate
dismissal or some other early disposition of RICO claims. Id.
Other attempts to restrict civil RICO litigation have been more substantive in nature.
For example, some circuits had construed the RICO Act to require a prior criminal
conviction for a predicate act as a prerequisite to a civil RICO claim based on that
activity, and others had required a distinct "racketeering injury" separate from the harm
caused by the predicate act. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 48893 (1985) (collecting cases). The Supreme Court rejected these substantive limitations
in Sedima because they were not supported by the language, the legislative history, nor
the policy considerations of the RICO statutes. Id. The Supreme Court found such
restrictions on civil RICO actions inconsistent with the express congressional admonition
that RICO "be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Id. at 498. The
Supreme Court acknowledged the problems caused by the increased filings and novel
uses of civil RICO actions, but concluded that such practical consequences did not
justify a narrow construction of the statute. Id. at 499-500.
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Because the RICO Case Statement mandates extensive and detailed
"fact pleading," and not the liberal "notice pleading" envisioned by
Federal Rule 8(a)(2), this local requirement conflicts with the Federal
Rules. 64 Presumably, the Southern District reasoned it had legal
authority for the mandatory RICO Case Statement under Federal Rule
9(b ), which requires in all averments of fraud that the "circumstances
constituting fraud ... be stated with particularity."65 This heightened
pleading standard for fraud claims does not, however, justify the
Southern District's elaborate RICO Case Statement. The Ninth Circuit
has repeatedly held that where the predicate act upon which the RICO
claim is based is fraud, Federal Rule 9(b) applies and the pleader must
allege with particularity the time, place, and specific content of the false
representations as well as the identities and roles of the parties to the
alleged fraudulent scheme. 66 However, the Southern District's RICO
Case Statement goes far beyond the particularity required by Federal
Rule 9(b) and the Ninth Circuit precedent. Subparagraph 5(c) of the
RICO Case Statement requests the specific factual information required
by Federal Rule 9(b) and the Ninth Circuit cases. 67 The remaining

64. In Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), the Supreme Court reversed a district
court decision requiring fact pleading as inconsistent with the notice pleading policy of
Federal Rule 8(a). The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that plaintiffs'
complaint was deficient because it failed to set forth specific facts to support its general
allegations of race discrimination:
The decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
require a claimant to set out in detail facts upon which he bases his claim. To
the contrary, all the Rules require is a 'short and plain statement of the claim'
that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.
Id. at 47 (footnote omitted).
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b ).
66. See, e.g., Lancaster Community Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940
F.2d 397, 404-05 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1992) (collecting cases
that require specification of such facts relating to predicate act of mail fraud); Moore v.
Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 541-42 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding
dismissal of complaint alleging predicate acts of mail and securities fraud); Alan
Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392-93 (9th Cir. 1988) (requiring
complaint to specifically plead such facts when predicate acts alleged are mail and wire
fraud).
67. Paragraph 5(c) of the Southern District's RICO Case Statement is but one of
seven subparts comprising paragraph 5. Paragraph 5, in its entirety, provides as follows:
5. Describe in detail the pattern of racketeering activities or collection of
unlawful debts alleged for each RICO claim. The description of the pattern
of racketeering shall include the following information:
a. List the alleged predicate acts and the specific statutes that were
allegedly violated;
b. Provide the date of each predicate act, the participants in each
predicate act, and a description of the facts constituting each predicate act;
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nineteen paragraphs require additional detailed factual allegations, far
beyond the type of specific factual averments of fraud required by
Federal Rule 9(b) and the Ninth Circuit decisions. 68
Moreover, the "predicate act" upon which a RICO claim is based need
not be one of fraud. "Racketeering activity" is defined by RICO as any
act or threat involving a variety of crimes chargeable under state law or
indictable under several provisions of Title 18 of the United States
Code. 69 Where the predicate act is not one of fraud, a civil RICO
claim would not trigger the heightened pleading standards of Federal
Rule 9(b). 70
The Supreme Court recently held in Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit71 that a federal court
cannot impose a more demanding pleading standard on one category of
claims as opposed to others unless expressly authorized to do so by
Federal Rule 9(b). Consequently, because the RICO Case Statement
requires particularity in pleading in instances not governed by Federal
Rule 9(b), Local Rule 11.1 violates the notice pleading requirements of

c. If the RICO claim is based on the predicate offenses of wire fraud,
mail fraud, or fraud in the sale of securities, the "circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." Fed. R. Civ. P.
9(b). Identify the time, place and substance of the alleged misrepresentations, and the identity of the persons to whom and by whom the alleged
misrepresentations were made;
d. State whether there has been a criminal conviction for violation of
any predicate act;
e. State whether civil litigation has resulted in a judgment with regard
to any predicate act;
f. Describe how the predicate act forms a "pattern of racketeering
activity;" and
g. State whether the alleged predicate acts relate to each other as part
of a common plan. If so, describe the alleged relationship and common
plan in detail.
General Order No. 386-B Revised, supra note 61.
68. See supra notes 62 and 67.
69. See supra note 60 (discussing federal statutory provisions that define civil
RICO claims).
70. Because the lengthy and detailed RICO Case Statement is deemed an amended
pleading by Local Rule 11. l(a), mandating its use may also conflict with the Federal
Rules: "No technical forms of pleadings are required." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(I).
71. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
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Federal Rule 8(a). 72 Except for Paragraph 5(c), the Southern District
should eliminate its RICO Case Statement pleading requirement.
2.

Sanctions for Noncompliance with Local Rules

Another area of potential conflict between the Southern District's local
rules and federal authority concerns the imposition of sanctions for
noncompliance with the local rules. Local Rule 1.3(a) states:
Failure of counsel or of any party to comply with these rules ... may be
ground for imposition by the court of any and all sanctions authorized by statute
or rule or within the inherent power or the court, including, without limitation,
dismissal of any actions, entry of default, finding of contempt, imposition of
monetary sanctions or attorneys' fees and costs, and lesser sanctions. 73

The Local Rules Project concluded that a local rule such as Rule
1.3(a) conflicts with the Federal Rules because it allows "the court to
impose sanctions altering the outcome of a case for a technical
violation."74
As those commentators recognized, while the district
court may impose such sanctions for a local rule violation that prejudices
the outcome of a case, the court may not impose claim-dispositive
sanctions because of a technical error. 75 In explaining that harsh
sanctions should not be available for technical violations, the Local

72. In Leatherman, the Supreme Court reviewed a Fifth Circuit rule that required
a plaintiff's complaint to state with factual particularity the basis for any 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 civil rights claims against municipalities or other local government entities. The
Supreme Court struck down the Fifth Circuit's heightened pleading standard as
incompatible with the liberal system of notice pleading set up by Federal Rule 8(a)(2).
Id. at 168-69. In the absence of an amendment to Federal Rules 8 and 9, the Supreme
Court observed, federal trial courts "must rely on summary judgment and control of
discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later." Id. Leatherman
instructs that, despite the laudable reasons that may have induced the Southern District
to adopt Local Rule I I.I, the RICO Case Statement requirement is inconsistent with
Federal Rules 8 and 9(b ).
The Ninth Circuit has recently utilized the Leatherman reasoning to strike down
heightened pleading standards previously imposed by district courts on complaints
alleging constitutional torts by government officials, where the subjective intent of the
defendants was not an element of the plaintiffs' claims. See, e.g., Housley v. United
States, 35 F.3d 400 (9th Cir. 1994); Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 14
F.3d 457,462 (9th Cir. 1994); but see Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449,451 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2704 (1994) {upholding heightened pleading standard for
qualified immunity cases and noting "the Court in Leatherman expressly stated it was
not deciding whether federal courts may employ a heightened pleading standard in
qualified immunity cases").
73. Local Rule 41.l(b), which states "[f]ailure to comply with the provisions of the
local rules of this court may ... be grounds for dismissal," provides additional specific
authority for claim-terminating sanctions. S.D. CAL. R. 41.l(b).
74. REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note l, at 7-9.
75. Id.
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Rules Project relied in part on Cintron v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 76 a
Ninth Circuit decision holding that the district court could not refuse to
consider a proffered complaint merely because the complaint did not
comply with technical local rules. Local Rule l.3(a), in some applications, may therefore conflict with federal law and should be amended to
authorize outcome-altering sanctions only for appropriate rule violations.77 The district court should modify this local rule to eliminate
this potential conflict.

76. 813 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1987). The plaintiff in Cintron mailed his complaint
to the district court for filing shortly before the relevant statute of limitations was to run.
Because the plaintiff failed to include a copy of the civil cover sheet, to punch two holes
in the top of the complaint, and to submit the correct filing fee (plaintiff submitted
$99.00 instead of the required fee of $60.00) as required by local rules, the clerk refused
to accept the complaint for filing and returned it to the plaintiff. Id. at 919. By the time
plaintiff refiled the corrected complaint, the statute of limitations had expired. Id. The
district court subsequently dismissed the action as untimely. The Court of Appeals
reversed, and observed that local rules designed for administrative purposes should not
be applied in a manner that defeats a litigant's access to the courts. Id. at 920.
The Ninth Circuit has often relied on Cintron for the proposition that local rules
merely regulate the practice of the court and should not be construed as affecting
jurisdiction. For example, in Smith v. Frank, 923 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth
Circuit held that the district court erred in refusing to accept plaintiff's timely filed
objections to a magistrate judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law, where the
ground for the refusal was that plaintiff's objections were too long, in violation of local
rules. Id. at 142. See also Lacuna v. G-K Trucking, 877 F.2d 741 (9th Cir.
l989)(reversing dismissal where clerk refused timely filed complaint because it violated
the local rule prohibiting use of fictional Doe defendants in pleading captions); Loya v.
Desert Sands Unified Sch. Dist., 721 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1983) (reversing dismissal based
on clerk's refusal to file timely complaint typed on wrong size paper, in violation of the
local rule); United States v. Dae Rim Fishery Co., 794 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir.
I 986)(reversing summary judgment where complaint, although timely filed, was rejected
pursuant to local rule because form of summons was improper).
77. Some applications of Local Rules l.3(a) and 41.l(b) would also appear to
conflict with new Federal Rule 83(a)(2), which took effect on December I, I 995, and
now provides: "A local rule imposing a requirement of form must not be enforced in
a manner that causes a party to lose rights because of a nonwillful failure to comply with
the requirement." FED. R. C!v. P. 83(a)(2), 161 F.R.D. 161 (1995). The purpose of
Federal Rule 83(a)(2) is to protect against loss of rights in the enforcement of local rules
relating to matters of form where the violation is nonwillful, but does not limit a court's
power to impose substantive penalties upon a party for contumacious or willful violations of a local rule, even one involving merely a matter of form. See FED. R. C!v. P.
83(a)(2) advisory committee's note.
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3.

Other Conflicts and Lapses in Clarity

The local rules of the Southern District contain many other provisions
that appear to conflict with the Federal Rules or federal statutes, albeit
with varying degrees of significance. 78 One such local rule arguably
inconsistent with federal law is Local Rule 74.0(i)(6), which authorizes
a magistrate judge to "[c]onduct voir dire and select petit juries for the
court in civil cases."79 Because this delegation of authority operates
regardless of the consent of the parties, it raises an issue of compliance
with the Federal Magistrates Act, 80 the federal statute defining the
limits of a magistrate judge's power. Courts of appeals in at least two
other circuits have concluded that jury selection in a civil trial is not one
of the duties that can be delegated under the Federal Magistrates Act to
a magistrate judge without the consent of the parties.81 Although the

78. There are numerous other notable problems with the Southern District's local
civil rules. For example, Local Rule I. I (c) permits a district judge to waive the
applicability of the local rules in a particular case and therefore may conflict with Ninth
Circuit cases construing Federal Rule 83. See. e.g., Standing Comm. v. Yagman, 55
F.3d 1430, 1435 n.8 (9th Cir. 1995) (ruling that because the district court may not
disregard the local rules it has promulgated with respect to the right to discovery in
disciplinary proceedings generally, it lacked the authority to dispense with discovery
altogether in a specific case); Martel v. County of Los Angeles, 34 F.3d 731,737 (9th
Cir. I 994)(holding that the district court's failure to comply with pretrial conference and
trial setting time limits in local rules required reversal, that local rules have the force of
law and are binding upon the parties and upon the court, and that a departure from local
rules that affects substantial rights requires reversal).
Two local CJRA rules authorize dismissal on the court's own initiative and without
notice to the plaintiff-Local Rule 4.1 (b) for failure to file timely proof of service of the
complaint and Local Rule 55.1 for failure to move for a default judgment within 30
days---and therefore raise due process concerns. S.D. CAL. R. 4.l(b), 55.1. Local Rule
45.1 requires any party not represented by counsel to submit a proposed subpoena
accompanied by a statement of reasons and to obtain approval from the court prior to
the issuance of a subpoena, and therefore is contrary to Federal Rule 45(a)(3) which
requires the clerk to issue a signed but otherwise blank subpoena to any party requesting
it. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(3) with S.D. CAL. R. 45.1. Another example is Local
Rule 7.1 which, among other things, expressly declines to follow Federal Rule 6(e) for
motion practice and instead adopts increases in various notice periods for certain mail
service that are inconsistent with Federal Rule 6(e). Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e) with
S.D. CAL. R. 7.1.
79. S.D. CAL. R. 74.0(1)(6).
80. 28 u.s.c. § 636 (1994).
81. See, e.g., Stockier v. Garratt, 974 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1992); Olympia Hotels
Corp. v. Johnson Wax Dev. Corp., 908 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1990). 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(3)(1994) authorizes a district court to assign to a magistrate judge "such
additional duties" as are not inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution and laws. In Gomez
v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989), the Supreme Court held that Congress did not
intend this additional duties clause to include the vital function of jury voir dire in a
criminal case. The Sixth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have extended the
Gomez rationale to civil cases and have concluded that under the Federal Magistrates
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Ninth Circuit has not yet weighed in on this issue, the Southern District
may find it prudent to limit Local Rule 74.0(i)(6) to those cases in which
the parties consent to jury selection by a magistrate judge. 82
One of the more curious conflicts is in Local Rule 65.2(b), which
governs the procedure for obtaining a temporary restraining order (TRO).
Local Rule 65 .2(b) states that "[e]xcept in those emergencies controlled
by Federal Rule 65(b), no judge of this court shall consider an application for a temporary restraining order unless the party against whom the
order is sought or counsel for that party is present at the time the
application is submitted to the court." 83 Federal Rule 65(b), referred
to as an exception to the local rule's requirements, delineates the
prerequisites and procedures for issuance of an ex parte TRO without
notice. 84 Therefore, by its exclusionary reference to Federal Rule
65(b), Local Rule 65.2(b) does not apply to ex parte TRO applications,
but only to TRO applications with notice. Although Federal Rule 65
requires notice to the adverse party as a prerequisite to the issuance of
a TRO in circumstances not governed by Federal Rule 65(b), it does not
require that the adverse party or attorney also be actually present. 85
The additional requirement of presence at the time of a TRO application
with notice----a requirement which invites a defendant with notice to
defeat a TRO application by the simple expedient of not showing up--is
therefore inconsistent with Federal Rule 65. Most likely the district
court did not intend Local Rule 65.2(b) to mean what it says! At any
rate, the Southern District should delete this enigmatic provision from
the local rule.
An illustration of a related problem is in Local Rule 7.1, a lengthy
rule with thirty-two subsections specifying the procedural requirements
of civil motion practice. 86 Many of these specific requirements raise
questions as to their consistency with the applicable Federal Rules. 87

Act, jury selection in a civil trial is not one of the additional supervisory duties which
can be delegated to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) without the
consent of the parties. E.g., Stockier, 974 F.2d at 732; Olympia Hotels, 908 F.2d at
1368-69.
82. See supra note 8 I.
83. S.D. CAL. R. 65.2(b).
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b).
85. Id.
86. S.D. CAL. R. 7.1.
87. The Local Rules Project observed that local rules governing motion practice
generally, such as Local Rule 7.1, are appropriate exercises of district court supplemental
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Perhaps aware of these possible conflicts, the Southern District, in the
first subsection of Local Rule 7 .1, advises that the provisions of this
local rule shall apply to motions and other requests for rulings by the
district court "unless contrary to statute or in conflict with a provision
of the F.R.Civ.P."88 In other words, a practitioner must follow the
motion procedure detailed in Local Rule 7.1 unless that procedure
violates a Federal Rule, in which case the practitioner must ignore the
local rule and follow the Federal Rule. Local Rule 7 .1 's disclaimer may
respond to inconsistency concerns, but obviously places a practitioner in
a precarious position. An attorney cannot rely on the detailed and
comprehensive local rule for proper motion practice procedures, but must
diligently consult the Federal Rules for contrary directions. This
approach is confusing and inefficient. 89 The Southern District should

rulemaking under Federal Rules 7 and 78 and should remain subject to local variation.
See REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note l, at 53-54. However, Local
Rule 7.1 does not merely supplement the Federal Rules, it also conflicts with them in
a few respects. For example, Local Rule 7.4(e)(4) directs the clerk not to accept a
motion for filing unless accompanied by proof of service, a technical requirement that
may conflict with Federal Rule 5(e) when enforced as to certain motions, such as a
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule 50 or a new trial
motion under proposed Federal Rule 59, which are required to be filed within a specified
time limitation (IO days after entry of judgment). See supra notes 56-58 and
accompanying text (discussing FED. R. CIV. P. 5(e)). Compare FED. R. C1v. P. 5(e) with
S.D. CAL. R. 7.4(e)(4). Local Rule 7.l(e)(8) directs the clerk's office not to file
untimely motions, and thereby raises concerns of unauthorized delegation of judicial
authority to the clerk's office. See FED. R. CIV. P. 77(c); S.D. CAL. R. 7. l(e)(8). Also,
Local Rule 7. l (e)(4) increases the various motion practice time periods for up to ten
days for certain mail service and only two days for overnight mail service, contrary to
Federal Rule 6( e) which mandates that three days be added to a prescribed period when
service of a motion paper is by mail. See irifra note 89. Compare FED. R. C1v. P. 6(e)
with S.D. CAL. R. 7. l(e)(4).
88. S.D. CAL. R. 7.l(a).
89. Local Rule 7.l(e)(4), for example, increases the various local time limitations
for filing motions and oppositions by mail by three days if the place of address is within
California, by five days if outside California, and by ten days if outside the United
States; but only by two days if service is by overnight mail. S.D. CAL. R. 7. l(e)(4).
Local Rule 7.l(e)(4) also expressly provides that the time extension of Federal Rule 6(e)
does not apply. Id. Federal Rule 6(e) requires the addition of three days to any
prescribed period after service by mail, and applies to service of any notice or court
paper. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e). Consequently, a practitioner must decide whether to incorporate the increased notice periods of Local Rule 7. l (e)(4) or the conflicting period of
Federal Rule 6(e). And to what effect is the disclaimer in Local Rule 7.l(a)? See S.D.
CAL. R. 7. l(a)("[U]nless contrary to statute or in conflict with a provision of the Fed.
R. Civ. P.," the local rules shall apply to motions and other requests for rulings by the
district court). Because Local Rule 7.1 (e)(4) is contrary to Federal Rule 6(e), does Local
Rule 7. l(a) make Local Rule 7. l(e)(4) inapplicable? Or does the pronouncement in
Local Rule 7. l(e)(4) that Federal Rule 6(e) is inapplicable mean that the federal rule's
time period really is inapplicable? This local rule is, to say the least, confusing.
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revise Local Rule 7 .1 to remove both the disclaimer and any apparent
conflicts with federal law.

IV.

LOCAL RULES THAT DUPLICATE FEDERAL LAW

Duplicative local rules, which one commentator charitably characterized as nuisances, 90 present a host of related problems. Local rules that
merely repeat provisions of the federal rules or federal statutes increase
the volume of local rules without adding any new procedural information. As such, they are unnecessary and in some instances misleading.
A practitioner may (incorrectly) believe that a duplicative local rule
repeats all the procedural guidelines of the analogous federal rule when
in fact the local rule may repeat only selected portions. In such circumstances, the practitioner may rely on the local rule and neglect the
federal rule in the mistaken belief that the seemingly comprehensive
local rule provides all the necessary procedural requirements. Obviously,
such reliance may produce unfortunate consequences for the attorney and
for the client.
A particularly annoying example of a duplicative local rule is one that
does not repeat verbatim a federal rule but instead paraphrases it. A
practitioner must carefully read such a local rule and compare it to the
federal analogue to determine whether the local rule adds any new
procedural information or merely repeats the requirements of the federal
rule in slightly different language. Many of the Southern District's local
rules applicable to criminal litigation suffer from this malady. For
example, Local Rule 9.3, a lengthy rule consisting of approximately
sixty paragraphs that specify the procedures applicable to writs of habeas
corpus and post-conviction motions, mostly repeats procedural information contained in the federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the
United States District Courts and the federal Rules Governing Section
2255 Proceedings in the United States District Courts. Local Rule 9.3
must be closely examined to ascertain the new prescriptions that actually

90. Mary Josephine Newborn Wiggins, Globalism, Parochialism and Procedure:
A Critical Assessment of Local Rulemaking in Bankruptcy Court, 46 S.C. L. REV. 1245,
1255 (1995). Professor Wiggins served as the Reporter for the Ninth Circuit Judicial
Council's Committee for the Review of Local Bankruptcy Rules. Her survey found
widespread local bankruptcy rule proliferation within the Ninth Circuit and several
instances where local bankruptcy rules were inconsistent with or duplicative of the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 1251-57.
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supplement, or in some instances conflict with, these comprehensive
federal rules. 91
The same criticism is appropriate for the Southern District's other
criminal procedure rules. 92 The fourteen lengthy and detailed local
rules governing criminal proceedings mostly repeat the requirements of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. These local rules do provide
some specific supplemental guidelines for practitioners, but disperse
them throughout eight pages of double-column fine print. A similar
problem is apparent in some of the six local rules that delineate the
duties and practices of the Southern District's magistrate judges.93
Much of the information in these rules is set forth in the Federal
Magistrates Act. 94 Likewise, the two local rules applicable to admiralty
claims and in rem actions duplicate provisions of the Federal Rules and
the federal Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime

91. Local Rule 9.3 does contain some useful supplementary infonnation such as
the procedures for appointment of counsel, the imposition of certain notice requirements
on the California Attorney General in death penalty cases, the assignment of petitions
to judges, and the guidelines for various stays of execution. See S.D. CAL. R.
9 .3(C)(2),(4),(6),(8),
The apparent conflicts between Local Rule 9.3 and the federal rules are sporadic and
subtle. For example, Local Rules 9.3(a)(4)(d) and 9.3(c)(9)(f) impose on the habeas
petitioner the duty to timely request an evidentiary hearing, whereas Rule 8(a) of the
Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings imposes on the court the duty to detennine
whether an evidentiary hearing is required without the procedural prerequisite of a
request by the petitioner. Compare R. GoVERNING SEC. 2254 PROC. IN THE U.S. DIST.
CTS. 8(a) with S.D. CAL. R. 9.3(a)(4)(d),(c)(9)(f). 28 U.S.C. § 224l(d) authorizes venue
either in the district where the petitioner is in custody or in which the petitioner was
convicted, and pennits the district court "in the exercise of its discretion and in the
furtherance of justice" to transfer to the other district. 28 U.S.C. § 224l(d)(1994). On
the other hand, Local Rule 9.3 declares the policy of the Southern District is that "a
petition should be heard in the district in which petitioner was convicted, rather than in
the district of petitioner's present confinement." S.D. CAL. R. 9.3(c)(7). Other examples
are Local Rules 9.3(b)(I) and 9.3(c)(5) which require the filing of more copies of the
habeas corpus petitioner than does Federal Rule 3(a). Compare R. GoVERNING SEC.
2254 PROC. IN THE U.S. DIST. CTS. 3(a) with S.D. CAL. R. 9.3(b)(I), (c)(5).
92. S.D. CAL. R. 73-73. 13.
93. S.D. CAL. R. 74-74.5.
94. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1994). The scheme of the Federal Magistrates Act,
however, necessitates some local rules. The Act defines the powers of magistrate judges,
but does not require their use unless authorized by the individual district court through
local rules or designated by a judge in a particular case. See id. § 636(b)(l)(A),(b)(4).
Although the Act identifies some of the specific activities magistrate judges are
authorized to undertake, id. § 636(a),(b)(J)(2),(c), it also generally provides "[a] magistrate may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States." Id. § 636(b)(3). This scheme requires the Southern
District to adopt local rules implementing the statutory authority and defining the
additional duties of magistrate judges. See, e.g., S.D. CAL. R. 74(a),(i), 74.1. Other
local rules, however, unnecessarily repeat provisions of the Act when a simple statutory
reference would suffice. See, e.g., S.D. CAL. R. 74(d).

576

[VOL. 33: 555, I 996)

Review of Local Rules
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Claims (Federal Admiralty Rules), although to a lesser extent than do the
local criminal rules. 95
The duplication problems discussed above are also evident in the
Southern District's civil rules. Several local civil rules reproduce
verbatim provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 9 More
prevalent are local rules that functionally repeat, paraphrase, or expressly
incorporate analogous Federal Rules in the course of announcing supplementary details and local variations. 97 Although what constitutes a

95. Local Rule 72.1, whose numerous subparts apply to admiralty and maritime
claims, often duplicates provisions of the Federal Admiralty Rules. For example, Local
Rule 72.1 (e) defines the right to a hearing to contest an attachment by essentially
repeating the content ofFederal Admiralty Rule E(4)(f). Compare FED. ADM. R. E(4)(f)
with S.D. CAL. R. 72. l(e). Local Rule 72. l(g) is repetitive of Federal Admiralty Rules
C(3) and C(6) in describing publication of notice. Compare FED. ADM. R. C(3) and
C(6) with S.D. CAL. R. 72. l(g). Local Rule 72. l(h) duplicates much of Federal
Admiralty Rules C(3) and C(6) regarding attachment of intangible property. Compare
FED. ADM. R. C(3) and C(6) with S.D. CAL. R. 72. l(h). Although Local Rule 72.2
duplicates parts of Federal Admiralty Rules E(2)(b) and E(4)(a)•(d) with respect to
security and the attachment process applicable to vessels, this local rule does contain
considerable supplemental information on the sale of arrested or attached property in an
in rem action. Compare FED. ADM. R. E(2)(b) and E(4)(a)•(d) with S.D. CAL. R. 72.2.
Conflicts with the Federal Admiralty Rules also occasionally occur in these local
admiralty rules. For example, Local Rule 72.l(i)(4) requires, as a prerequisite to a de•
fault judgment, that notice of suit be given by mail to the owner of an attached vessel,
but only if personal service can not be done; whereas Federal Admiralty Rule B(2) does
not require efforts to personally serve the notice as a precondition to mail service.
Compare FED. ADM. R. B(2) with S.D. CAL. R. 72.l(i)(4). Also, Local Rule 72.2
requires the posting of security for costs in the amount of $500 unless otherwise ordered
in in rem actions, whereas Federal Admiralty Rule E(2)(b) appears to make the
imposition of any such security a matter of discretion. Compare FED. ADM. R. E(2)(b)
with S.D. CAL. R. 72.2.
96. See, e.g., S.D. CAL. R. 5. l(k) (reproducing much of the language of FED. R.
C1v. P. I0(b) in requiring pleadings with numbered paragraphs and separate statements,
without adding any new guidelines); id. 33.1 (reproducing the numerical limitation of
25 interrogatories contained in FED. R. Clv. P. 33(a)).
97. See, e.g., S.D. CAL. R. l.l(c), l.2(a) (repeating much of FED. R. CIV. P. 83
when describing the scope and availability of local rules); id. 3.2(a) (repeating the
requirement of FED. R. C1v. P. 8(a) as to pleading jurisdiction); id. 4.l(a) (expressly
incorporating FED. R. C1v. P. 4 and repeating the service time limitation of FED. R. Civ.
P. 4(m)); id. 4.l(d) (incorporating FED. R. CIV. P. 5 and repeating portions of FED. R.
C1v. P. 5(a)•(c) with respect to service of pleading, other than the original complaint);
id. 5.2 (repeating parts of FED. R. Clv. P. 5(d) with respect to proof of service); id. 7.1
(expressly incorporating FED. R. C1v. P. 6 as to computation of time); id. 23.1 (repeating
portions of FED. R. CIV. P. 23 as to class action allegations); id. 51.1 (expressly
incorporating FED. R. CIV. P. 51 as to filing of jury instructions); id. 54.l(a) (expressly
incorporating numerous federal rules and statutes applicable to costs and repeating
portions of FED. R. C1v. P. 54); id. 65.2 (repeating some of FED. R. C1v. P. 65 when
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"duplicative" local rule prohibited by amended Federal Rule 83 is
subject to legitimate debate, under a reasonably broad construction
substantial portions of the Southern District's civil rules on service of
process, form of papers, proof of service, motion practice, habeas corpus
and post-conviction motions, class actions, discovery, jury instructions,
findings of fact, temporary restraining orders, and clerk's orders are
suspect. 98 Likewise, much of the Southern District's criminal rules
could be eliminated, the local rules applicable to magistrate judges could
be shortened, and the two lengthy admiralty rules could be streamlined.
Employing such a standard of abrogation would result in local rules
greatly reduced in quantity, perhaps by as much as one-third the volume
of the current Southern District rules, with a corresponding increase in
quality.
V.

A.

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

The Ninth Circuit and the Southern District Should Eliminate
Inconsistent and Duplicative Local Rules

Local rules are a fact of federal court life. Despite the disunity they
create, local rules are not likely to go away. As supplements to the gaps
in the federal rules, some local district court rules are obviously
desirable. But the Southern District, and most other district courts as
well, must do a better job of policing its rules to remove conflicts and
duplications. Where the conflict is due to the Southern District's
unintentional failure to conform to amendments in the federal rules, the
solution is fairly simple: The district court must pay closer attention to
federal rule amendments. The Southern District surely has the resources
to track periodic amendments to the federal rules and revise its local
rules accordingly. There is little excuse for a district court not to have
incorporated the 1991 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure into the 1996 version of its local rules.
With respect to those rule conflicts that may be "intentional"--those
where the district court knowingly departs from the federal rules without
CJRA or Federal Rules authorization---the solution is more complicated.
The forthcoming report of the Committee to Review Local District Rules
should provide valuable specific recommendations to the Ninth Circuit
Judicial Council and to the district court. But the willingness of the

describing TRO procedures); id. 74.3 (expressly incorporating FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e));
id. 77.2 (essentially repeating the provisions of FED. R. C1v. P. 77(c), 55(b), in describing orders grantable by the clerk).
98. See sources cited supra note 97.
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Judicial Council to impose local rule changes, and the degree to which
the district court will voluntarily incorporate the Committee's recommendations, remains to be seen. 99 The substantial amount of effort and
resources needed for the current Committee's review project---the first
comprehensive review oflocal rules undertaken by the Ninth Circuit and
one of the few such circuit reviews nationally 100-makes it unlikely
that such an effort can be sustained on an ongoing or periodic basis.
The Committee report therefore will provide the Southern District with
a rare opportunity to scrutinize its existing local rules based on an
independent review. If the Southern District balks at implementing the
report's recommendations, the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council must be
prepared to impose these recommendations through the exercise of its
local rules oversight power. Absent a strong effort by the Judicial
Council to directly abrogate or modify local rules that conflict with

99. To date, district courts have shown little inclination to review and eliminate
conflicts in their own local rules, and most circuit judicial councils have not made
serious efforts to implement their oversight responsibilities under Federal Rule 83 and
the Judicial Improvements Act. See Memorandum from David Pimental, Assistant
Circuit Executive, United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit to Local Rules Review
Committee (Feb. 8, l995)(on file with author). Professor Tobias offers various
explanations for these failures. See Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 5, at 363. First, the
circuit judges serving on the circuit council may have deferred to the district courts
because they believed the district judges knew more about civil litigation at the trial
court level. Id. Second, the district court judges may have been less concerned about
reducing inconsistencies than with furthering what they believed to be the best interests
of their own districts. Id. Third, individual district courts may have been unwilling to
review their own rules because they were protective of their own prerogatives to adopt
and apply local procedures and were unwilling to admit that the very rules they
promulgated may be unnecessary or inconsistent with federal laws. Id. District judges
serving on circuit councils may have been reluctant, out of lack of familiarity with local
conditions elsewhere or out of professional courtesy, to critically examine the local rules
of other districts. Id. at 363-64. Fourth, few circuit councils had the resources and
personnel to undertake the onerous task of comprehensive local rules review. Id. at 364.
Finally, the adoption of the CJRA in 1990 made circuit councils reluctant to scrutinize
local rules when Congress had apparently authorized the district courts to adopt
experimental cost and delay reduction procedures which may depart from the Federal
Rules. Id. Likewise, individual federal district courts were too busy formulating
experimental procedures pursuant to the CJRA's mandates to worry whether their new
or existing local rules conformed to federal laws other than the CJRA.
l 00. According to a survey of eleven other circuit judicial councils by David
Pimentel, Assistant Circuit Executive for Legal Affairs, United States Courts for the
Ninth Circuit, apparently only the Seventh Circuit has made serious efforts to undertake
comprehensive and periodic review of local rules of each district within the circuit. See
Memorandum from David Pimental, supra note 99.
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federal laws, the recommendations of the Committee may have little
practical effect.
Even more daunting is the task of identifying and eliminating local
rules that duplicate federal rules. Whatever may be the merits of the
view that local rules should repeat or paraphrase their federal analogues,
that approach is precluded by the 1995 amendment to Federal Rule 83.
The weeding out of duplicative rules is essential to the Judicial Improvements Act's goal of reversing the proliferation of local rules, but may
prove difficult to accomplish. One reason is that amended Rule 83 does
not define the term "duplicative," leaving room for legitimate debate as
to its meaning. 101 Another is the district court's obvious predilection
for detailed local rules which, to be comprehensive, necessarily must
repeat federal rules. The resources required to identify and analyze
duplicative local rules, combined with the likely resistance to rule
pruning from the district court itself, make meaningful review of this
aspect of local rules problematic. Nevertheless, the Southern District
and the Judicial Council must devote the same kind of effort to the
elimination of duplicative rules as they would to inconsistent rules. As
with inconsistent rules, the Judicial Council must be willing to impose
modification of duplicative local rules if the district court fails to do so.
The Southern District should purge its local rules of all duplicative
provisions, leaving in place only those rules which actually supplement
the various federal rules, implement the CJRA, or opt out of the 1993
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Employing this
standard, the Southern District could eliminate substantial portions of its
civil, criminal, and admiralty rules. Such abrogation would result in
local rules, greatly reduced in volume, that deal with such topics
properly the subject of local variation. 102
B.

The Ninth Circuit Should Institutionalize the Local Rules Review
Process

After the Local Rules Committee has completed its work, the Ninth
Circuit Judicial Council should institutionalize the local rules review
10 I. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
102. The Local Rules Project has identified a number of areas where local variation
is not only permissible but desirable. These include such topics as the general format
of papers, in forrna pauperis, social security cases, motion practice, pretrial conferences
and orders, appointment of guardians, assignment of cases to trial, the mechanics of trial,
jury selection, use of masters, taxation of costs, receiverships, the duties of magistrate
judges, court hours and sessions, duties of court personnel, use of court libraries,
courtroom decorum and security, and admission to practice. REPORT OF THE LOCAL
RULES COMMITTEE, supra note 1. The Local Rules Project also included several model
local rules as part of its recommendations. Id.
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process. In light of the amount of effort necessary to mount the current
Committee review process, that volunteer task force approach to local
rules review is simply too burdensome to be practical on an ongoing or
periodic basis. In the past, the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council, the entity
directed by the Judicial Improvements Act to undertake local rules
review, has apparently lacked the resources necessary to perform this
task. 103 But the current Committee now provides the Ninth Circuit
with a window of opportunity to effectively institutionalize local rules
review in the future. When the Committee submits its report and
recommendations, the Judicial Council will be in the position to assure
that all then-existing local rules within the Ninth Circuit are consistent
with and not duplicative of the Federal Rules and federal statutes.
Thereafter, as each district court within the circuit proposes new local
rules, those proposed rules should be forwarded to the Judicial Council
for a preadoption compliance review. The Judicial Council could assign
this review responsibility to existing Ninth Circuit staff, or, as is the
practice of the Seventh Circuit, may hire appropriate independent
persons to conduct the compliance review on an as needed basis. 104
This type of ongoing, institutionalized maintenance program would be
far less burdensome than the periodic, comprehensive approach exemplified by the current volunteer task force review. The Ninth Circuit
Judicial Council must act now to put in place the staff and resources
necessary to implement local rule oversight on an ongoing, systematic,
and meaningful basis. 105

103. Chief Judge J. Clifford Wallace, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
apparently had difficulty obtaining sufficient funding for comprehensive local rules
review as part of the Ninth Circuit's budget. See Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 5, at
365. This lack of financial resources undoubtedly contributed to the Ninth Circuit
Judicial Council's decision to delegate its local rule oversight responsibilities to the
volunteer Committee to Review Local District Rules.
104. See Memorandum from David Pimentel, supra note 99, at 2. The Seventh
Circuit pays one of the law professors involved in the Local Rules Project to review all
bankruptcy and district local rules for consistency with the national rules; her analysis
goes to the subject court for response before consideration by the Seventh Circuit
Judicial Council. Id.
105. Professor Tobias recommends that the district court advisory groups and circuit
committees created under the CJRA merge with the local rules committees and circuit
judicial councils required by the Judicial Improvements Act and earlier legislation.
Tobias, Improving the Acts, supra note 13, at 1628. The newer entities have already
achieved their principal purpose-the formulation of delay and cost reduction plans---and
the older institutions can now competently assume both the CJRA monitoring and the
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local rules oversight responsibilities. Id. Local rules committees reconstituted in this
manner could provide valuable assistance to district courts in reviewing existing and
proposed local rules. Id. at I 629.
Implementation of this recommendation would reverse the proliferation of local rules
institutions, but may not be sufficient to curtail the proliferation of local rules
themselves. Certainly a single, unified local advisory committee would result in a more
efficient and better coordinated local rules revision process. Less certain is whether such
a committee at the district court level could effectively accomplish the goals of
eliminating inconsistent and duplicative local rules. For a variety of reasons, the district
courts have been unwilling to critically scrutinize their own rules. See discussion supra
note 99. With respect to inconsistent and duplicative local rules, the district courts
traditionally have been part of the problem and not the solution. See supra notes 14-23
and accompanying text. The abrogation of such local rules may therefore only occur if
imposed on the district courts by the relevant circuit judicial council.
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